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Abstract
This paper reviews theoretical results on financial policy. We use basic account-
ing identities to illustrate relations between gross assets and liabilities, net debt
positions and the appropriation of (primary) budget surplus funds. We then discuss
Ramsey policies, answering the question how a committed government may use fi-
nancial instruments to pursue its objectives. Finally, we discuss additional roles for
financial policy that arise as a consequence of political frictions, in particular lack
of commitment.
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1 Introduction
Tax policy determines when and how the government collects funds from the private
sector while financial policy determines how the government shifts purchasing power over
time and across states of nature, using market transactions. Conditional on government
spending, every tax policy in a dynamic environment goes hand in hand with a financial
policy. If the timing of tax collections is of concern to the government, for example
because it affects tax distortions or the distribution of tax burdens across agents, then so
is financial policy.
When the government only has access to a single security, as often (implicitly) assumed
in macroeconomic models and the public debate, the link between tax and financial policy
is immediate: The characteristics of the security constrain the set of feasible tax policies,
and a given feasible tax policy directly implies the corresponding financial policy. In
practice, however, governments have access to a multitude of financial instruments, in
particular debt securities and financial assets of different maturities. This multitude of
instruments renders the link between tax and financial policy richer and sets the stage
for a host of issues that are absent in environments with a single security. In particular,
it leads to questions about (i) gross versus net asset positions; (ii) valuation effects and
their consequences for the relation between deficit and net asset quotas; (iii) financial
engineering to circumvent or relax financial market frictions; and more generally, (iv)
optimal government portfolio choice, among others.
This paper reviews findings about the effects of financial policy. Its remainder is
composed of four sections. Section 2 builds on basic accounting identities to clarify the
relationships between the appropriation of (primary) budget surplus funds and the accu-
mulation of gross and net assets and liabilities. Section 3 reviews qualitative and quanti-
tative theoretical results on optimal (Ramsey) financial policies under commitment. The
policy prescriptions discussed in this section derive from four central motives of financial
policy—to exploit arbitrage opportunities; to smooth the shadow value of public funds
subject to plausible restrictions on the set of available financial instruments; to strengthen
resilience; and to achieve other goals like market access or liquidity provision to the private
sector. Section 4 reviews theoretical results on optimal financial policy that explicitly take
political factors into account. Of central interest in that context are issues of credibility
and incentive compatibility. Section 5 concludes.
2 Accounting
Consider a government with gross assets at and gross liabilities lt, both expressed as
a fraction of GDP, and a primary surplus quota pt.
1 Primary surplus funds are used to
either pay for new asset purchases or principal and interest on outstanding liabilities. The
1The IMF defines gross debt (in our notation: lt) as “[a]ll liabilities that require future payment of
interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor” and net debt (in our notation: lt− at) as “[g]ross
debt minus financial assets, including those held by the broader public sector” IMF (2012, pp. 98–99).
We abstract from non-financial assets of the government as well as from different levels and sectors of
government.
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corresponding primary surplus quotas are denoted pat and p
l
t, respectively, with pt = p
a
t+p
l
t.
Between period t− 1 and period t, nominal GDP grows at rate gt; assets pay an interest
rate rat and experience a capital gains or losses rate v
a
t ; and liabilities pay an interest rate
rlt and experience a capital gains or losses rate v
l
t. The laws of motion for the gross asset
and liabilities quotas, respectively, are given by2
at = at−1
1 + rat + v
a
t
1 + gt
+ pat , (1)
lt = lt−1
1 + rlt + v
l
t
1 + gt
− plt. (2)
According to (1), the asset quota increases only if the total return on assets, rat + v
a
t ,
exceeds the growth rate, gt, or if primary surplus funds flow into asset accumulation.
According to (2), the liabilities quota increases if the total return on liabilities exceeds
the growth rate sufficiently strongly to compensate for any flow of primary surplus funds
into liabilities repayment.
In steady state, the growth rate, interest rates, and capital gains or losses rates are
time-invariant.3 In a “primary-surplus regime” or “pr” for short, the primary-surplus
quota is time invariant as well. In contrast, in a “surplus regime” or “sr” for short
(discussed below), the total rather than primary-surplus quota is time invariant.
From (1) and (2), a primary-surplus regime is consistent with the steady state asset
and liabilities quotas
apr = −p
a
φa
, lpr =
pl
φl
where we have defined
φat ≡
rat + v
a
t − gt
1 + gt
, φlt ≡
rlt + v
l
t − gt
1 + gt
.
The dynamics are convergent towards the steady state values apr and lpr (such that the
government inter temporal budget constraint holds) if ra + va < g and rl + vl < g that is,
φa < 0 and φl < 0. In economies where the return on assets equals the marginal product
of physical capital, this corresponds to a dynamically inefficient economy.4 The speeds of
adjustment (with non-oscillatory dynamics) then are given by φa for the asset quota and
2Equation (1) follows from the accounting identity
At = At−1(1 + rat + v
a
t ) + P
a
t
that describes the evolution of the stock of nominal government assets, At. Here, P
a
t denotes the part of
the nominal primary surplus that funds asset purchases. Dividing both sides of the equation by nominal
GDP, Yt, and using the fact that At−1/Yt = At−1/(Yt−1(1 + gt)) yields (1). Equation (2) can be derived
in parallel.
3We denote the steady state value of a generic variable xt by x.
4For discussions of dynamic efficiency see, for example, Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser
(1989).
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φl for the liabilities quota.5 Ruling out strictly negative gross asset or liabilities quotas
under a convergent primary-surplus regime requires that pa ≥ 0 and pl ≤ 0.
The total surplus is composed of the primary surplus and the government’s net interest
income. In parallel to the primary-surplus quota, the surplus quota st can be decomposed
into the asset and liabilities related quotas
sat ≡ pat + at−1
rat
1 + gt
, slt ≡ plt − lt−1
rlt
1 + gt
with st = s
a
t + s
b
t . Using these definitions, (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
at = at−1
1 + vat
1 + gt
+ sat , (3)
lt = lt−1
1 + vlt
1 + gt
− slt. (4)
A surplus regime is consistent with the steady state asset and liabilities quotas
asr = − s
a
χa
, lsr =
sl
χl
where we have defined
χat ≡
vat − gt
1 + gt
, χlt ≡
vlt − gt
1 + gt
.
The dynamics are convergent towards the steady state values asr and lsr if va < g and
vl < g that is, χa < 0 and χl < 0. The speeds of adjustment (with non-oscillatory
dynamics) then are given by χa for the asset quota and χl for the liabilities quota. Ruling
out strictly negative gross asset or liabilities quotas under a convergent surplus regime
requires that sa ≥ 0 and sl ≤ 0. In contrast with a primary-surplus regime, convergent
dynamics in a surplus regime do not only arise in a dynamically inefficient economy.
A comparison of the laws of motion in a convergent surplus regime on the one hand
and primary-surplus regime on the other make clear that the transition paths always differ
unless the transition in each regime starts from steady state and the steady states under
5Using the steady state relationships, (1) and (2) can be rewritten as
at − at−1 = φat (at−1 − apr) + apr(φat − φa) + (pat − pa),
lt − lt−1 = φlt(lt−1 − lpr) + lpr(φlt − φl)− (plt − pl).
With interest, capital gains and growth rates as well as the primary surplus quotas at their steady state
values, the first equation can be expressed as
at − apr = (1 + φa)(at−1 − apr).
Dynamics are convergent for −1 < 1 + φa < 1 or −2 − g < ra + va < g. With convergent dynamics, a
steady state deviation at−1 − apr is reduced by the fraction −φa over one period. A parallel argument
applies for the liabilities quota.
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both regimes coincide.6 Similarly, convergent surplus and primary-surplus regimes imply
different steady state asset and liabilities quotas unless7
sa = pa
va − g
ra + va − g , s
l = pl
vl − g
rl + vl − g .
The transition path and steady state value of the net asset quota nt ≡ at − lt in a
convergent surplus regime depends on the appropriation of the surplus and the difference
between the capital gains rates on assets and liabilities. Letting ∆srt ≡ {vat − vlt}/(1 + gt),
(3) and (4) imply
nt = nt−1
1 + vlt
1 + gt
+ at−1∆srt + st, n
sr = − s
a
χl + ∆sr
− s
l
χl
.
Similarly, the transition path and steady state value of the net asset quota in a convergent
primary-surplus regime depends on the appropriation of the primary surplus and the
difference between the returns on assets and liabilities.8
The preceding results can be summarized as follows:
i. Convergent dynamics in a surplus regime may arise in dynamically inefficient and ef-
ficient economies; in a primary-surplus regime, they require a dynamically inefficient
economy.
ii. A convergent surplus regime almost always implies a different transition path and
steady state net asset quota than a primary-surplus regime.
iii. In a convergent surplus regime, the appropriation of the surplus as well as the
difference between the capital gains rates on assets and liabilities affect the net
asset quota. Similarly, in a convergent primary-surplus regime, the appropriation
of the primary surplus as well as the difference between the returns on assets and
liabilities affect the net asset quota.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the importance of the decomposition of s into sa and sl in
a surplus regime. The parameter values underlying the figures resemble values that are
relevant for Sweden (Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, 2012, p. 80).9 Figure 1 plots asr and
6For the transition paths to be identical across regimes, the sequences {at, lt} must satisfy
sa = pa + at
ra
1 + g
, sl = pl − lt r
l
1 + g
in all periods. This is only possible if at = a
pr = asr and lt = l
pr = lsr.
7This follows from the restrictions pa/φa = sa/χa and pl/φl = sl/χl.
8Letting ∆prt ≡ {(rat + vat )− (rlt + vlt)}/(1 + gt), (1) and (2) imply
nt = nt−1
1 + rlt + v
l
t
1 + gt
+ at−1∆
pr
t + pt, n
pr = − p
a
φl + ∆pr
− p
l
φl
.
9For both figures, we assume ra = rl = 0.02, g = 0.05, va = 0.02, vl = 0.00, s = 0.01.
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lsr against the share of the surplus that flows into asset purchases, sa/s. A value of one for
sa/s indicates that all of the surplus is used to purchase assets such that sl = 0. The steady
state liabilities quota then equals zero (because vl < g) and the steady state asset quota
equals 0.35. A value of two for sa/s indicates that twice the surplus is used to purchase
assets; this implies that new liabilities are issued to fund the asset purchases (sl = −s).
The steady state asset and liabilities quotas then equal 0.7 and 0.21, respectively, and
the steady state net asset quota exceeds the one that results when sa/s = 1, due to the
capital gains on the higher asset quota.
Figure 2 plots the values for pa and pl implied by sa/s under the restriction that the
steady state asset and liabilities quotas under the primary-surplus and surplus regimes be
identical. The figure shows that, holding the total surplus quota s constant, an increase in
sa/s from one to two is equivalent to a doubling of pa from 0.003¯ to 0.006¯ and a decrease
of pl from 0 to −0.006. The total primary surplus quota falls as sa/s increases, again
due to the capital gains on the higher asset quota. Under the assumption of a higher
interest rate on assets and liabilities, the steady state asset and liabilities quotas remain
unchanged as long as the surplus quotas are not altered. The absolute values of the
equivalent primary-surplus quotas pa and pl fall.10
1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
sa  s
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
asr, lsr, nsr
Figure 1: asr (dashed), lsr (dotted) and nsr (solid) as functions of sa/s, for fixed s.
Changes in the government’s asset and liabilities quotas a and l may go hand in hand
with changes in the capital gains rates on these positions, va and vl respectively, for
example because an expansion of asset purchases alters the relative exposure to different
asset classes.11 Consider a surplus regime and let ηa and ηl denote the elasticities of χa
with respect to a, and of χl with respect to l, respectively. For sa > 0, the elasticity ηa is
positive if va decreases with a, and negative otherwise. Similarly, for sl < 0, the elasticity
10With ra = rl = 0.025 and the other parameter values unchanged, we have pa = 0.0016¯ and pl = 0
when sa/s = 1 and pa = 0.003¯ and pl = −0.005 when sa/s = 2.
11Changes in a and l may also be correlated with variations in the economy’s long-term growth rate,
for example because of induced changes in the national savings rate (Diamond, 1965).
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1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
sa  s
-0.010
-0.005
0.005
0.010
pa, pl, p
Figure 2: pa (dashed), pl (dotted) and p (solid) as functions of sa/s, for fixed s and subject
to the restriction that apr = asr, lpr = lsr.
ηl is positive if vl declines in l, and negative otherwise.12 The change in the steady state
asset and liabilities quotas due to a move from an initial surplus target of s = sa + sl to
a new one characterized by the changes ds = dsa + dsl is given by
−dsa = dasrχa + asrdχa = dasrχa(1 + ηa),
dsl = dlsrχl(1 + ηl),
implying that the net asset quota changes by
dnsr = dasr − dlsr = − ds
a
χa(1 + ηa)
− ds
l
χl(1 + ηl)
.
With convergent dynamics (χa < 0 and χl < 0) and elasticities in excess of minus
one, a higher surplus quota necessarily implies a higher steady state net asset quota. The
magnitude of the net asset quota’s increase due to a higher surplus quota depends on how
ds is split between dsa and dsl. If χa(1 + ηa) is less negative than χl(1 + ηl), as would
typically be the case due to a positive capital gains rate on assets and a zero capital
gains rate on liabilities, the net asset quota increases the stronger the more of the surplus
quota rise is allocated to asset accumulation. The intuition for the non-neutrality of the
composition of surplus changes is the same as for the non-neutrality of the composition of
the surplus: If capital gains rates on assets exceed those on liabilities (suitably adjusted
for the relevant elasticities) then gross asset growth contributes more strongly to net asset
accumulation than the reduction of gross liabilities.
Summarizing:
12We have
ηa =
∂χa/∂a
χa
a =
va′(a)/(1 + g)
χa
(−sa)
χa
= −sa v
a′(a)(1 + g)
(va − g)2 , η
l =
∂χl/∂l
χl
l = sl
vl
′
(l)(1 + g)
(vl − g)2 .
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iv. In a convergent surplus regime, an increase in the surplus quota typically has a
stronger positive effect on the steady state net asset quota if it funds the accumu-
lation of assets rather than the repayment of liabilities.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the effect of a change of surplus quota, ds, on the steady
state net asset quota, dnsr. The parametric assumptions underlying the figures are those
underlying the previous figures (see footnote 9) as well as ds = −0.01, corresponding to
a reduction of the surplus quota from 1 to 0 percent. Figure 3 is constructed under the
assumption that the capital gains rate increases in the level of assets (va′(a) = 0.02) while
figure 4 is constructed under the opposite assumption (va′(a) = −0.02); in both cases, the
capital gains rate on liabilities is assumed to equal zero, independently of the liabilities
quota.
Figure 3: dnsr as function of sa/s and dsa/ds, for fixed s and ds and va′(a) > 0.
The figures show that a reduction of the surplus quota implies a fall in the net asset
quota. If dsa/ds = 0 such that all of the adjustment occurs through a change of sl the
gross asset quota remains unchanged and the gross liabilities quota increases (such that
the net asset quota falls) by 0.21. If part of the adjustment occurs through a change of
sa the surplus reduction leads to a stronger fall in the net asset quota because the gross
asset quota which generates capital gains is reduced. The fall in the net asset quota is
particularly pronounced if va′(a) is positive because the capital gains rate then declines
with the stock of assets. Moreover, the magnitude of dnsr also depends on the elasticity
ηa and thus, on the initial steady state asset quota asr and therefore the surplus quota sa.
9
Figure 4: dnsr as function of sa/s and dsa/ds, for fixed s and ds and va′(a) < 0.
3 Ramsey Policies
Let τ denote a tax policy and T the set of admissible tax policies satisfying certain
institutional restrictions. Similarly, let f denote a financial policy and F the set of
admissible financial policies implied by the financial instruments at the government’s
disposal. In section 2, τ was implicit in the sequence of primary surpluses {pt} and f
corresponded to the sequence {at, lt}. More generally, a financial policy may include
many more elements as discussed below. A policy (τ, f) is feasible if it is admissible and
satisfies the government’s dynamic budget constraints as well as other implementability
constraints. A policy is optimal (indicated by a “star”) if it is the best feasible policy
under commitment. We assume that the government evaluates feasible policies according
to the allocations they implement.
The financial instruments at the government’s disposal may be redundant, and the lack
of (other) financial instruments may be constraining. Financial instruments are redundant
if a given tax policy in combination with multiple admissible financial policies implements
the same allocation such that the set of optimal financial policies, F? ⊆ F say, contains
multiple elements. Lack of financial instruments is constraining if the optimal policy
(τ, f)? implements an allocation that is strictly inferior to the allocation implemented by
another policy that uses more financial instruments.
Whether financial instruments or the lack thereof are redundant and/or constraining
depends on the nature of tax policies. Under the conditions of the Ricardian equivalence
proposition (Barro, 1974) tax policy does not affect the equilibrium allocation (condi-
tional on government spending)—the tax policy under a balanced budget requirement
and any other tax policy satisfying the government’s inter temporal budget constraint
10
implement the same allocation.13 This implies that the optimal tax and financial policies
are indeterminate; every financial instrument is redundant; and there is no constraining
lack of financial instrument.
Under less restrictive conditions, the timing of taxation does affect the equilibrium
allocation, unlike in a Ricardian environment.14 The optimal tax policy then is deter-
minate (or at least not fully indeterminate) but the optimal financial policy may still be
indeterminate; some financial instruments may be redundant; and the lack of others may
be constraining.
Of interest for our purposes are theories of F? conditional on F . We consider several
such theories, focusing on those in which financial policy does not “trivially” follow from
the optimal tax policy: We do not discuss basic, deterministic “tax smoothing” policies
(see Barro (1979)) or the implications for financial policy of “tax shifting” (allocating the
burden of taxation across groups, see Diamond (1965) or Niepelt (2004b)). Instead, we
concentrate on the implications for financial policy of the objective to exploit arbitrage
opportunities; to smooth the shadow value of public funds subject to plausible restrictions
on the set of available financial instruments; to strengthen resilience; and to achieve other
goals like market access or liquidity provision to the private sector.
We often consider a simple three period economy, t = 0, 1, 2, that is subject to risk in
the intermediate period. The state of nature in period t = 1 may either be “0” or “1”,
with ex-ante probability pi and 1 − pi respectively. Since the economy is not subject to
risk after the intermediate period, the event tree of the economy includes five nodes or
histories, one in the initial period and two each in periods t = 1 and t = 2. We index
these five nodes by  = 0, 10, 11, 20, 21 where the first digit of the index represents the
period and, if applicable, the second one the state of nature (see figure 5).
Let q,ˆ denote the price of an Arrow security in history  that pays off in history ˆ. In
line with the notation introduced in the previous section, we denote primary government
surpluses by p. Moreover, we denote by α,ˆ ≥ 0 and λ,ˆ ≥ 0 the number of claims that
are issued at node  and stipulate payment of one unit in history ˆ to the government or
from the government, respectively; the net lending position is denoted by ν,ˆ ≡ α,ˆ−λ,ˆ.
Gross assets a¯ and liabilities l¯ as well as net assets n¯ ≡ a¯ − l¯ at node ¯ therefore
correspond to the present values of all outstanding α,ˆ’s, λ,ˆ’s and ν,ˆ’s, respectively.
In this economy, the government has access to at most twelve fundamental financial
instruments: Four short-term Arrow securities (both assets and liabilities) issued in the
initial period; four long-term Arrow securities issued in the initial period; and four short-
13For related neutrality results, see Sargent (1987), Rangel (1997), Coleman (2000), Ghiglino and Shell
(2000), Bassetto and Kocherlakota (2004), Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2010).
14Examples of environments where the timing of taxation affects the allocation include, among others,
open economies where the private sector has no access to financial markets and relies on the government,
through non-distorting tax and debt policy, to smooth disposable income and household consumption (as
assumed in sovereign debt models (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981)); economies where taxes are distorting
and the government aims at minimizing (“smoothing”) tax distortions (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey,
1983; Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppa¨la¨, 2002); economies where the timing of taxation affects the
wealth distribution (Diamond, 1965; Niepelt, 2004b); or economies where government bonds serve the
private sector as a savings and self insurance vehicle (Aiyagari and McGrattan, 1998; Shin, 2006). See
also Missale (1999, ch. 2).
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t=0 t=1 t=2
Ε=0
Ε=10 Ε=20
Ε=11 Ε=21
Π
1-Π
Figure 5: Event tree.
term Arrow securities issued in the intermediate period in any of the two states of nature.
Absent any restrictions on financial instruments, the set of admissible financial policies
F thus is given by
Fu = {α0,10, α0,11, λ0,10, λ0,11, α0,20, α0,21, λ0,20, λ0,21, α10,20, α11,21, λ10,20, λ11,21|α ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0}
where the superscript “u” stands for unrestricted and α and λ denote the vectors of long
and short positions.
The government’s budget constraints reflect the pricing kernel q and the available
financial instruments defined by F . If the kernel is arbitrage free the dynamic budget
constraints of the government read
p0 =
∑
i=0,1 q0,1i(ν0,1i + q1i,2iν0,2i),
p1i + ν0,1i = q1i,2iν1i,2i, i = 0, 1,
p2i + ν0,2i + ν1i,2i = 0, i = 0, 1.
 (5)
If, in addition, the set of financial instruments is sufficiently large to render financial
markets complete then the dynamic budget constraints (5) reduce to the single, inter
temporal budget constraint
p0 +
∑
i=0,1
q0,1i(p1i + q1i,2ip2i) = 0. (6)
A policy (τ, f) and the allocation it implements pin down the primary surpluses across
the five histories, (p0, p10, p11, p20, p21), as well as the net asset positions (at the beginning
of the period) (0, ν0,10 + q10,20ν0,20, ν0,11 + q11,21ν0,21, ν0,20 + ν10,20, ν0,21 + ν11,21).
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3.1 Exploiting Arbitrage Opportunities
Arbitrage opportunities for the government may arise if government lending and borrowing
is priced off different pricing kernels. In a deterministic environment this corresponds
to different interest rates on borrowing and lending. Suppose that only state “0” may
materialize such that pi = 1 and let
F = {f ∈ Fu|α0,11 = λ0,11 = α0,21 = λ0,21 = α11,21 = λ11,21 = 0}.
Suppose further that the government lending gross interest rate equals r as does the
government borrowing rate between periods t = 1 and t = 2 but that between periods
t = 0 and t = 1, the borrowing rate q−10,10 may differ from r. The dynamic budget
constraints of the government then read
p0 + q0,10λ0,10 = r
−1(α0,10 + r−1ν0,20),
p10 + ν0,10 = r
−1ν10,20,
p20 + ν0,20 + ν10,20 = 0
and imply the inter temporal budget “constraint”
∑2
t=0 r
−tpt = (r−1 − q0,10)λ0,10.
If q0,10 > r
−1 such that the government may borrow at a lower rate than lend the inter
temporal budget constraint of the government does not bind. Accordingly, the govern-
ment’s optimal portfolio structure involves unbounded short-term borrowing, λ?0,10 →∞,
if taxation is socially costly. More realistically, the market discount factor q0,10 may
initially exceed r−1 but as λ0,10 increases, q0,10 may fall until it equals r−1. With this
modification, the government’s inter temporal budget constraint does bind but gross bor-
rowing continues to optimally exceed net borrowing if the government wishes to relax its
budget constraint.
The latter qualification is important. While exploiting arbitrage opportunities can help
improve the budgetary position of the government it need not be (socially) optimal. For
example, if the government aims at maximizing private sector welfare, and if the private
sector’s financial losses mirror the reduction in tax collections due to the government’s
arbitrage gains, then exploiting arbitrage possibilities may be pointless. This qualification
notwithstanding, practitioners appear to view certain debt restructuring operations, for
example concerning “on-the-run securities,” as profitable and attractive.15
Summarizing:
v. Gross government borrowing optimally exceeds net borrowing when the govern-
ment’s lending rate exceeds the borrowing rate and if the government wishes to
relax its budget constraint.
15According to OECD (2013, p. 108), “exchanges and buybacks allow debt managers to increase the
issuance of on-the-run securities above and beyond what would otherwise have been possible. The result-
ing more rapid build-up of new bonds enhances market liquidity of these securities. This in turn should
eventually be reflected in higher bond prices. Hence, ... these operations may also contribute to lower
funding costs for governments.” The reason why investors wish to acquire securities of a particular type
although those do not offer higher yield presumably relates to the fact that the sought-after securities
deliver additional services relative to comparable financial instruments. Guibaud, Nosbusch and Vayanos
(2013) propose a model of “bond market clienteles.”
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3.2 Smoothing the Shadow Value of Public Funds
Consider next the environment with risk and suppose that the kernel is arbitrage free.
Suppose furthermore that the government in period t = 0 has access to a short-term
security with return vector [1 γ]′ in nodes  = 10 and  = 11, respectively, and a long-
term security with return vector [1 δ]′ in nodes  = 20 and  = 21, respectively, where γ
and δ denote non-negative scalars. Moreover, the government may borrow or lend short
term in nodes  = 10 and  = 11 such that
F = {f ∈ Fu|ν0,10γ = ν0,11, ν0,20δ = ν0,21}. (7)
Government policy is constrained by (5) and (7) as well as certain other implementability
constraints.
Consider any security held between periods t = 0 and t = 1 and let r1 denote its state
contingent gross return in period t = 1. If private investors hold the security the usual
Euler equation u′0 = βE[u′1r1] states that the expected net benefit of doing so equals zero
at the margin.16 A parallel Euler equation applies for the government that weighs the
benefit and cost of issuing or holding the security. Letting ζ denote the normalized
17
multiplier in the government’s Ramsey program attached to the government dynamic
budget constraint the government’s Euler equation reads
ζ0u
′
0 = βE[ζ1u′1r1].
Accordingly, the net benefit for the government of the security depends on the tightness
of its budget constraint in period t = 0 (ζ0u
′
0), the average tightness in period t = 1,
the security’s average return E[r1] and the correlation of the return with the tightness in
period t = 1. If taxes in node  are not distorting then ζ = 0.
If markets are complete for private investors then the price of an Arrow security
satisfies q0, = βprob()u
′
/u
′
0. If markets are complete for the government then the price
of the same Arrow security also satisfies q0, = βprob()ζu
′
/ζ0u
′
0. As a consequence,
ζ0 = ζ for all  if both the government and the private sector face complete markets. If
the government faces incomplete markets, in contrast, then ζ may not be constant across
histories.18
Consider a financial policy f ∈ F that is implemented using the portfolio ω =
[ω0,1, ω0,2, ν10,20, ν11,21]
′. Here, ω0,1 and ω0,2 denote the government’s net positions in the
short- and long-term security in period t = 0, respectively. The cash flows c across nodes
10, 11, 20 and 21 that are generated by this portfolio equal c = Mω with
M =

1 0 −q10,20 0
γ 0 0 −q11,21
0 1 1 0
0 δ 0 1
 .
16The Euler equation assumes that investors have time separable preferences with discount factor β;
u′t denotes the potentially random marginal utility in period t.
17By the investor’s marginal utility of consumption in the state as well as the latter’s ex-ante probability.
18If the security pays a safe return and both the government and the private sector hold it then
ζ0u
′
0 = βE[ζ1u′1]r1 and u′0 = βE[u′1]r1. This implies ζ0 = E[ζ1u′1]/E[u′1].
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If γq10,20 = δq11,21 then M is singular, markets are incomplete and (7) constrains both
f ? and τ ?. If γq10,20 6= δq11,21, in contrast, then M has full rank, markets are complete (the
return vectors of admissible portfolios span the state space) and the constraints (5) and
(7) collapse to the inter temporal budget constraint (6). In this case, only (6) constrains
τ ? while (7) and τ ? constrain f ?. In particular, since the financial policy must finance
the primary deficits −p? = −(p?10, p?11, p?20, p?21) under the optimal tax policy, restriction
(7) requires p? = −Mω?. Since M is invertible a unique ω? exists that satisfies this
restriction, namely ω? = −M−1p?. The optimal short- and long-term net positions thus
are given by
ω?0,1 =
δq11,21P
?
10 − q10,20P ?11
γq10,20 − δq11,21 , ω
?
0,2 =
P ?11 − γP ?10
γq10,20 − δq11,21
respectively, where P ?10 ≡ p?10+q10,20p?20 denotes the present discounted value of government
surpluses at node 10 and P ?11 ≡ p?11 + q11,21p?21.
Farhi (2010) discusses the government’s Euler equation (or counterpart of the standard
C-CAPM equation) in a model with safe government bonds and risky capital as well as
labor and capital income taxes. In his model, the government faces incomplete markets
because bond returns are risk free and taxes on capital income are predetermined for one
period. In a calibrated version of the model, Farhi (2010, p. 944) finds that the optimal
policy involves huge and opposing positions in debt and physical capital. Whether the
government should go long or short in physical capital depends on the relative prevalence
of productivity and government spending shocks.
Bohn (1990) also discusses optimal government debt policy from an incomplete mar-
kets risk sharing perspective.19 He assumes risk neutral consumers and a convex tax
collection cost function h(τ) along the lines of Barro (1979)20 such that ζ = h
′(τ). Ac-
cordingly, the government’s Euler equation reads
h′(τ0) = βE[h′(τ1)r1]
for every security in the government’s portfolio. Comparing this optimality condition with
US time series, Bohn (1990) analyzes the usefulness of various securities for tax smoothing
purposes. Under several simplifying assumptions and based on US data until 1989, he
finds that “a number of security returns are correlated with tax rates, leading to a rejection
[of the hypothesis that the government optimally employs these securities to smooth tax
collection costs]. Estimates of optimal debt portfolios provide strong support for using
nominal, nonindexed, government debt, but provide only weak evidence on the maturity
distribution. Moreover, it seems that the government could improve tax smoothing by
having some nontraditional liabilities, like foreign-currency debt or a short position in the
stock market” (p. 1229).
Summarizing:
vi. The government’s portfolio choice problem parallels the program of a private in-
vestor. The optimal portfolio composition depends on the correlation between se-
curity returns and the tightness of the government budget constraint.
19See also Gale (1990) and Missale (1999).
20See Farhi (2010, p. 935) for a critical discussion.
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vii. With complete markets, the shadow value of public funds is constant and conditional
on the government’s inter temporal budget constraint, tax and financial policy are
disconnected.
viii. Bohn (1990) assesses which securities may be employed to smooth the shadow value
of government funds across states. His analysis could be updated and his approach
extended and applied to other countries.
In the following, we consider realistic restrictions on Fu that give rise to a hedging
motive for the government.
3.2.1 Non-Contingent Yields
If the yields on government securities are not contingent on the state of nature then
F = {f ∈ Fu|ν0,10 = ν0,11, ν0,20 = ν0,21}. (8)
Denoting short- and long-term net lending by ν0,1 and ν0,2, respectively, an admissible fi-
nancial policy f ∈ F is characterized by the net lending positions ν = [ν0,1, ν0,2, ν10,20, ν11,21]′.
Restriction (8) constitutes a special case of (7) (and ν constitutes a special case of ω)
with γ = δ = 1. It follows from the previous discussion that markets are complete if
q10,20 6= q11,21, and incomplete otherwise.
Consider first the complete markets case where the constraints (5) and (8) collapse to
the inter temporal budget constraint (6). The non-contingent yield restriction (8) then
implies an optimal maturity structure in period t = 0,
ν?0,1 =
q11,21P
?
10 − q10,20P ?11
q10,20 − q11,21 , ν
?
0,2 =
P ?11 − P ?10
q10,20 − q11,21 .
Suppose node 10 represents a business cycle upturn and node 11 a downturn, implying
P ?10 > 0 (primary surpluses) and P
?
11 < 0 (primary deficits) under the optimal policy. If the
interest rate in the downturn is lower than in the upturn (q11,21 > q10,20) then (8) implies
a short-term net borrowing position and a long-term net lending position, ν?0,1 < 0 < ν
?
0,2.
Intuitively, state contingent primary surpluses call for counterbalancing net asset positions
and more specifically, higher net assets in the downturn. A portfolio with long-term net
lending generates such state contingent net assets even in the absence of contingent yields
because it produces capital gains on the long-term loans in the downturn when market
interest rates drop, and capital losses in the upturn when interest rates rise.
If the interest rate in the downturn is higher than in the upturn, in contrast, then the
optimal financial policy involves short-term net lending and long-term net borrowing. In
either case the size of the lending or borrowing positions increases with the magnitude
of the present discounted primary surpluses or deficits. Moreover, it decreases with the
interest rate differential in the two states—larger interest rate differentials allow for smaller
gross positions.
Angeletos (2002) extends the above complete markets analysis. He considers an infinite
horizon, closed economy with as many maturities as states. Interest rates in his model
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are stochastic because the Ramsey tax policy supports a stochastic consumption profile
and thus, a stochastic inter temporal marginal rate of substitution of the representative
household. In a baseline example with government spending shocks, Angeletos (2002)
finds that primary surpluses tend to go hand in hand with low interest rates. In line with
the above discussion, he finds that the optimal maturity structure in the baseline example
involves short-term net lending and long-term net borrowing.
Buera and Nicolini (2004) argue, however, that these predictions are not robust. They
report that small variations in parameter values imply large changes in the optimal matu-
rity positions in the model, and that these positions are very large in absolute value and
far from what is observed in the data. In an example with four states of nature that is
calibrated to match US data, their model predicts an optimal financial policy that swaps
bonds “on the order of a few hundred times total GDP each period” (p. 553).
Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2010) extend the analysis of Buera and Nicolini (2004) by
incorporating physical capital and habits in the model. They report that the predicted
optimal maturity positions remain very large and are volatile. Faraglia et al. (2010)
confirm Buera and Nicolini’s (2004) finding that the model predictions for both the size
and the sign of the maturity positions are very sensitive to changes in stipulated parameter
values or assumptions regarding the available maturities. They also argue that subject
to potential model misspecification or transaction costs, an optimizing government would
“prefer to follow a balanced budget rather than implement the optimal portfolio structure
recommended by the complete market approach” (p. 835).
Summarizing:
ix. The restriction that securities may not have state contingent yields is not costly if
the government has access to a sufficiently rich set of maturities and interest rates
are state contingent. In this case, markets are complete and the non-contingent
yield restriction implies an optimal maturity structure. According to simulation
results, the predictions of the complete market approach to the choice of maturity
structure are sensitive to changes in the model specification and not in line with the
data.
When the government has access to fewer maturities than there are states of nature, or
if interest rates do not sufficiently vary across states then the government faces incomplete
markets and optimally engages in precautionary savings. Moreover, if it has access to
multiple securities, the government solves a portfolio choice problem of the type discussed
earlier.
Aiyagari et al. (2002) analyze the government’s precautionary savings motive under
the assumption that the government may only issue short-term debt with non-contingent
yield. They find that the government optimally accumulates net assets up to the point
where the interest income from the net asset position suffices to finance worst case gov-
ernment spending.21
21In Aiyagari et al.’s (2002) representative agent environment the inter generational wealth distribution
is of no concern. Bhandari, Evans, Golosov and Sargent (2013) extend Aiyagari et al.’s (2002) model to
incorporate heterogeneity.
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Nosbusch (2008) analyzes the maturity choice in an incomplete markets model where
the government has access to short- and long-term nominal bonds with non-contingent
yields only. In contrast to Bohn (1990), he allows for risk aversion on the part of investors
and thus, in equilibrium, higher yields on securities that provide risk sharing benefits.
For the same reason as in the complete markets case (Angeletos, 2002) he finds that
the government should optimally borrow long term and lend short term. The implied
maturity positions are large.
Nosbusch (2008) also finds that the incomplete markets restriction is not very costly;
the extent of optimal tax smoothing when only two maturities can be employed is not
much smaller than the extent in a complete markets environment with many maturities.
Nosbusch (2008, p. 479) argues that even in the presence of debt overhang as well as
constraints on government lending, some long-term borrowing is optimal but at the same
time, “leverage is necessary for achieving a substantial fraction of the benefits of tax
smoothing across states.”
According to Faraglia et al. (2010, p. 822), however, Nosbusch’s (2008) results are not
robust: “Small variations even in the choice of maturities available to the government can
easily reverse the issue-long-buy-short recommendation as can allowing for both produc-
tivity and expenditure shocks.”
Summarizing:
x. According to simulation results, restrictions on the set of available securities have
minor costs. However, the predictions of the incomplete market approach to the
choice of maturity structure are sensitive to changes in the model specification and
not in line with the data.
When payoffs are specified in nominal terms stochastic inflation renders real returns
state contingent. This triggers the question whether monetary policy can and should help
hedge fiscal shocks, by influencing inflation. The answer to this question clearly is in the
affirmative if inflation is without other economic consequences. In the more plausible case
where inflation does have such additional consequences a trade-off emerges.
Siu (2004) analyzes a model where the government has powers to affect inflation. In
his model, unanticipated inflation renders bond returns state contingent but also causes
relative price distortions and as a consequence, costly misallocation. The Ramsey policy
balances the hedging benefits of state-contingent real yields against these misallocation
costs. Siu (2004, p. 577) finds that “for post-war calibrations, the gains from achieving
state-contingency in real debt returns are small relative to the misallocation costs induced
by variable ex-post inflation.” This finding is consistent with the conclusions discussed
earlier according to which the cost of reduced smoothing possibilities due to restrictions on
financial instruments is limited. However, Siu (2004, p. 577) adds that “[a]s the volatil-
ity in government spending increases, the shock absorbing benefits of state-contingent
inflation come to dominate the costs of resource misallocation.”
Hall and Sargent (2011) decompose the evolution of the government debt quota in
the United States and document the time varying contribution of surprise inflation to
it. Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2013, p. 14) report that “IMF staff simulations
suggest that, for the G7 economies, if inflation were to increase from the current average
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projected pace of less than 2 percent to, say, 6 percent, the net debt ratio would decline,
after five years, by about 10 percent of GDP on average . . . . The effect would be larger
if central banks could maintain lower real interest rates for some time.”
Summarizing:
xi. When yields are specified in nominal terms and are restricted to be non-contingent
unanticipated inflation can partially compensate for the lack of explicit state con-
tingency. But misallocation as a consequence of unanticipated inflation renders this
costly. According to simulation results, unanticipated inflation is an inefficient fiscal
shock absorber unless the shocks are very large.
3.2.2 Borrowing Constraints
If the government is subject to a borrowing constraint, for example due to a “sudden
stop” in funding markets, then fresh borrowing is ruled out and as a consequence, fresh
net lending strictly positive. The wider implications of this depend on the financial market
structure.22
Consider first the case where the government only has access to short-term securities
with non-contingent yields and faces a borrowing constraint in node  = 11. The set of
admissible financial policies then is given by
F = {f ∈ Fu|ν0,10 = ν0,11, ν0,20 = ν0,21 = 0, ν11,21 ≥ 0}.
In this environment, the threat of a binding borrowing constraint in period t = 1 may
lead the government to save more in period t = 0 than it would save if no such threat
were present—it may build up a “buffer stock” in direct analogy with household behavior
in a savings problem.23
In particular, suppose that the government values disposable funds in a period accord-
ing to some strictly increasing and concave payoff function.24 The government’s value
function of net assets brought into period t = 1 then is strictly increasing and concave
as well. With a binding borrowing constraint in period t = 1 disposable funds in the
period are smaller than with a non-binding constraint and accordingly, the slope of the
value function is higher. The expected slope of the value function in period t = 1 thus
increases with the risk that the borrowing constraint binds. Since the optimal financial
policy equates the expected shadow values of public funds between the two periods risk of
a binding borrowing constraint in the intermediate period increases optimal net lending
in the initial period.
Access to longer-term securities may soften or even undo these implications of a bor-
rowing constraint. This can most clearly be seen in a deterministic environment: While
the borrowing constraint then prevents the government from directly shifting funds from
22The discussion abstracts from economy wide borrowing constraints. The latter may give rise to
efficiency losses due to pecuniary externalities. See, for example, Bianchi (2011).
23See Gollier (2001, chapter 18) for a discussion of buffer stock saving. Aiyagari (1994) analyzes
precautionary saving of households in general equilibrium.
24Buffer stock saving is a consequence of risk aversion, not prudence (Gollier, 2001, chapter 18).
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period t = 2 to period t = 1 it can be neutralized without cost by borrowing long term
and lending short term in the initial period. Markets thus are complete and the borrowing
constraint is irrelevant.
The empirically more relevant case involves both risk and a borrowing constraint, in
node  = 11 say. Suppose as before that yields must be non-contingent. The set of
admissible financial policies then is given by
F = {f ∈ Fu|ν0,10 = ν0,11, ν0,20 = ν0,21, ν11,21 ≥ 0}.
In parallel to the environment without risk, the possibility to borrow long term in the
initial period has the consequence that the borrowing constraint need not imply positive
net asset holdings in node  = 11. Nevertheless, and in contrast with the environment
without risk, the borrowing constraint in combination with the non-contingent yields
restriction renders markets incomplete25 and a trade-off emerges between insurance and
inter temporal smoothing. More specifically, long-term lending in period t = 0 may be
beneficial for insurance purposes while long-term borrowing may be attractive because it
relaxes the borrowing constraint.
Bianchi, Hatchondo and Martinez (2013) analyze the implications of an occasionally
binding borrowing constraint in a small open economy where only the government has
access to financial markets. Bianchi et al. (2013) do not study the Ramsey problem but as-
sume that the benevolent government cannot commit. As a consequence, the government
may opportunistically default along the equilibrium path. Allowing for debt of different
maturities Bianchi et al. (2013) find in simulations that the optimal policy subject to lack
of commitment uses long-term borrowing and short-term lending to relax the borrowing
constraint.
Summarizing:
xii. Even if the government has access to a rich set of maturities and interest rates are
stochastic, markets may be incomplete if a non-contingent yield restriction is accom-
panied by a (stochastic) borrowing constraint. In this case, the optimal financial
policy trades off insurance and inter temporal smoothing.
To gain more insight into the trade-off between insurance and inter temporal smooth-
ing, consider an infinite horizon model with two possible states in each period: a “normal”
state with ex ante probability pi and a sudden stop state where the government is sub-
ject to a borrowing constraint. Gross interest rates equal rn in the normal state and
rs in the sudden stop state. In the normal state, a short-term zero coupon security
trades at price 1/rn and a long-term (two period) zero coupon security at price 1/R
2 with
R2 = rn(pirn + (1− pi)rs).
Suppose the government lends or borrows constant fractions of GDP short term and
long term as long as the economy remains in the normal state. Denoting short- and
long-term net lending quotas by ν+1 and ν+2, respectively, the surplus quota in a normal
period equals
sn = pn +
ν+1
1 + g
+
ν+2
(1 + g)2
− ν+1
rn
− ν+2
R2
,
25Markets are complete if the borrowing constraint does not bind.
20
reflecting the primary surplus quota, maturing short- and long-term net lending positions
from previous periods (suitably normalized by the economy’s growth rate) as well as fresh
short- and long-term net lending. The net asset quota in a normal period reflects maturing
securities as well as the market value of outstanding long-term net lending positions that
is,
nn =
ν+1
1 + g
+
ν+2
(1 + g)2
+
ν+2
(1 + g)rn
.
In a sudden stop the interest rate changes to rs and as a consequence, the net asset
quota (after a longer spell of normal periods) equals
ns =
ν+1
1 + g
+
ν+2
(1 + g)2
+
ν+2
(1 + g)rs
while the liquid net asset quota is given by
nliqus =
ν+1
1 + g
+
ν+2
(1 + g)2
if long-term investments cannot be sold before maturity.
Conditional on values for (pi, rn, rs, g) and a fixed net asset quota in normal periods,
nn, the choice of maturity structure (ν+1, ν+2) determines the net asset quota ns and
liquid net asset quota nliqus in a sudden stop as well as the “financial surplus quota” in
normal periods, sn − pn. In particular, manipulation of the above relationships yields
ns = nn +
ν+2
1 + g
(
1
rs
− 1
rn
)
,
nliqus = nn − ν+2
(1 + g)rn
,
sn − pn = nn
(
1− 1 + g
rn
)
+ ν+2
(
1
r2n
− 1
R2
)
.
The first two equations confirm the earlier finding of potentially conflicting objectives:
When rs < rn then high net assets in a sudden stop (allowing to compensate for higher
primary deficits) are incompatible with high liquid net assets (providing fiscal space in
spite of the borrowing constraint). On the one hand, long-term net lending provides
insurance because the market value of outstanding long-term loans appreciates in a sudden
stop. On the other hand, conditional on nn, long-term net lending (and accordingly, short-
term net borrowing) reduces liquid net wealth. If interest rates during sudden stop periods
rise, in contrast, then the conflict disappears.
A second conflict of interest arises with respect to the net asset quota in a sudden stop
and the financial surplus quota in normal times. Independently of whether rs < rn or not,
the effect of long-term net lending on these two quotas is of opposing signs. Intuitively,
when interest rates fall during a sudden stop then insurance requires a long-term net
lending position. But in this case, R < rn and long-term lending therefore implies, on
average, lower interest revenue than short-term lending. The reverse argument applies
when rs > rn.
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Note that the conflict between the objectives of providing insurance and liquidity and
doing so at low cost is present conditional on the net asset position in normal periods, nn,
as well as the primary surplus, pn. Running a higher primary surplus or accumulating a
higher net asset quota therefore does not alter the fundamental conflict.
Summarizing:
xiii. For the choice of maturity of government securities, the objective to hedge fiscal
shocks may or may not conflict with the objective to relax borrowing constraints,
while the objective to hedge fiscal shocks always conflicts with the objective to
generate surpluses in normal times. These conflicts are present for any level of
primary surplus or net asset quota.
If illiquidity arises for some other reason than maturity then the previous analysis
applies in modified form. Suppose that one form of short-term net lending, ν+1, has one
period gross return r and can be transformed into cash in all periods while the other form,
ν+2, has one period return R and cannot be transformed into cash in sudden stop periods.
We then have
sn = pn +
ν+1
1 + g
+
ν+2
1 + g
− ν+1
r
− ν+2
R
,
nn = ns =
ν+1
1 + g
+
ν+2
1 + g
,
nliqus =
ν+1
1 + g
and manipulation of these relations yields ns = nn as well as
nliqus = nn − ν+2
1 + g
,
sn − pn = nn
(
1− 1 + g
r
)
+ ν+2
(
1
r
− 1
R
)
.
If the return R on the illiquid asset is higher than the return r on the liquid one then
the objectives to provide liquidity and to generate surpluses in normal times necessarily
conflict.
Summarizing:
xiv. In the presence of an illiquidity premium, the objective to provide liquidity during
a sudden stop conflicts with the objective to generate surpluses in normal times.
This conflict is present for any level of primary surplus or net asset quota.
3.3 Strengthening Resilience
When an individual investor’s willingness to purchase government debt depends on her
expectation about other investors’ decisions, multiple equilibria may arise. For example,
a “good” equilibrium may occur where all investors perceive the government’s financial
situation as healthy and as a consequence, decide to extend credit at favorable conditions
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such that the government can roll over its debt without problems. But a “bad” equilibrium
may occur as well where investors are pessimistic and do not extend credit or do so
only subject to harsh conditions such that the government cannot roll over its debt in a
sustainable manner.
When large volumes of debt have to be refinanced within a short time span—as is
the case when government debt is short-term rather than long-term with maturity dates
spread out across periods—it is more likely that a bad equilibrium may occur. Long-
term funding therefore renders government finances less vulnerable and may for that
reason be preferable to short-term financing. Arguments along this line have been pro-
posed, for example, by Calvo (1988), Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990), Giavazzi and
Pagano (1990), Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Cole and Kehoe (2000).26 Related, OECD
(2013, p. 52) argues that “panicky market reactions may generate self-fulfilling proph-
esies. . . . [O]vershooting and undershooting of prices can be observed whereby ‘animal
spirits’ (threaten to) push government securities markets into self-fulfilling bad equilibria.
For example, a recent study shows that animal spirits are playing an important role in
explaining sovereign CDS spreads for euro area bond markets, especially during highly
stressful episodes.” Phelan (2004) draws a distinction between the maturity of debt and
the sequencing of debt rollovers which matters for rollover crises. Recent academic and
policy discussions in the context of the European debt crisis focus on the role of central
bank policy for fiscal resilience if government debt is local currency denominated (see,
for example, Aguiar, Amador, Farhi and Gopinath, 2013; Blanchard et al., 2013; Corsetti
and Dedola, 2013).
Chamon (2007) shows that a simple mechanism may be able to eliminate the coordi-
nation failure at the root of a rollover crisis. His mechanism renders an investor’s bid for
new government debt contingent on the government being able to secure sufficient funding
from other investors. As a consequence, individual investors are no longer exposed to the
risk that a self fulfilling rollover crisis may occur and their equilibrium strategy therefore
is to offer refinancing according to the good equilibrium terms. No convincing argument
has been brought forward to explain why sovereign debt auctions do not make use of this
mechanism.
Contrary to the logic of lengthening the maturity structure in order to reduce rollover
risk it is sometimes proposed to “diversify” rollover risk by issuing debt instruments of
different characteristics, including many different maturities. Underlying this proposal
could be the view that different debt instruments are traded on segmented markets whose
risks of “break down” are independent. OECD (2013, p. 22) discusses diversification along
the maturity dimension for fiscal resilience reasons.
Due to financial repression, home bias or other reasons domestic investors are more
likely to hold government liabilities than foreigners; they might also be less likely to “run”
in times of fiscal stress. As a consequence, a debt ownership structure tilted towards
domestic creditors may strengthen fiscal resilience.27
26See also Conesa and Kehoe (2012).
27OECD (2013, ch. 4, 5) discusses how during the European debt crisis challenges in primary markets
lead sovereigns to broaden the investor base and to change issuance procedures to improve resilience.
Bond exchanges and buybacks were also used to reduce rollover risk (OECD, 2013, ch. 6).
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Summarizing:
xv. The probability of a bad equilibrium with a rollover crisis may depend on the extent
of short-term funding, the currency denomination of public debt and central bank
policy as well as the ownership structure of public debt. A better contracting
approach may help eliminate the bad equilibrium.
3.4 Achieving Other Goals
Financial policy can help achieve other goals. We discuss two of them, the more narrow
fiscal goal of market access and the broader macroeconomic goal of liquidity provision.
3.4.1 Market Access
The market micro structure of financial markets may imply that the terms of the gov-
ernment’s market access respond to changes in the net supply of government securities.
This might reflect asymmetric information between a government willing to sell or buy
securities and private investors considering buying or selling them or technical and time
constraints in the rating and underwriting process.
One approach to modeling endogenous market access builds on the extreme assumption
that a government that is not borrowing or lending in a particular market segment in
period t will be borrowing or lending constrained in the subsequent period. Conditional
on not borrowing or lending in period t, the government then foresees future financial
policy choices that resemble those discussed in subsection 3.2.2. The new trade-offs arise
from a comparison of the cost of borrowing or lending more than otherwise optimal in a
period and the benefit of avoiding a borrowing or lending constraint in the future.
A more plausible approach posits that the cost of borrowing and the return on lending
are functions of the government’s gross borrowing or gross lending positions in the current
period relative to those positions in the previous period. It is natural to assume in this
case that the gross lending rate is a decreasing function and the gross borrowing rate an
increasing function of its argument. Letting ϕ denote either lending or borrowing, the
Euler equation for borrowing and/or lending discussed in subsection 3.2 then is modified
to
ζtu
′
t = βE
[
ζt+1u
′
t+1r
ϕ
t+1
]
+ βE
[
ζt+1u
′
t+1r
ϕ′
t+1
ϕt,t+1
ϕt−1,t
]
− β2E
[
ζt+2u
′
t+2r
ϕ′
t+2
ϕ2t+1,t+2
ϕ2t,t+1
]
where the two new terms on the right-hand side represent the price effects on inframarginal
borrowing or lending in the current and subsequent period. The logic of the variable-
interest-rate case in subsection 3.1 applies. As long as the marginal benefit of gross lending
(the right-hand side of the above Euler equation with lending) exceeds the marginal cost
of gross borrowing (the right-hand side with borrowing) financial policy can be improved
by increasing gross lending and borrowing positions.
Summarizing:
xvi. A concern for market access under adverse funding conditions may rationalize larger
gross borrowing and lending positions than otherwise warranted.
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3.4.2 Liquidity Provision
If government debt provides liquidity services or otherwise is “special” among the assets
held by the private sector then issuing government debt may have beneficial macroeco-
nomic effects on its own.28 We review several arguments along those lines.
Woodford (1990) and Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) emphasize the role of public debt
for creating private liquidity when productive agents are borrowing constrained because
of limited commitment. The authors point out that issuing public debt and lowering
contemporaneous taxes improves the liquidity position of these agents and enables them to
better exploit gains from trade. Public debt issuance therefore can help support economic
activity if the government can commit (to future taxation) while private agents cannot.
An implication of the above argument is that government borrowing should be posi-
tively correlated with the severity of commitment problems in the private sector relative
to the severity of such problems for the government. Woodford (1990) and Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1998) assume that the government can fully commit such that credibility
problems in the public sector are absent. More realistically, one may assume that govern-
ments face credibility problems as well or maybe even more pronounced ones, in particular
when public debt issuance is high (see the discussion in subsection 4.1.2).29 In the recent
financial crisis, credibility of private sector agents (banks) initially suffered more than the
trustworthiness of governments but in relative terms, the credibility of the public sector
has deteriorated since. According to the public-debt-as-private-liquidity view, this rela-
tive deterioration should have been accompanied by austerity in the sense of public debt
reduction.
Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) highlight another macroeconomic role for government
debt. In their model, households may save in the form of physical capital and public debt.
Both assets have the same return characteristics but in general equilibrium, capital and
debt accumulation have different effects on production and inter personal risk sharing.
As a consequence, there exists an optimal supply of government debt.
Financial market participants frequently point to different reasons for the special na-
ture of government debt, for example that government securities are particularly useful as
collateral and store of value because they can easily be bought and sold on highly liquid
markets. But this empirical observation need not imply that government securities are of
a special nature that makes it socially beneficial to supply more of them than otherwise
warranted. First, it could be the case that the observed equilibrium with government debt
as the predominantly used collateral is just one outcome among many (equally efficient)
ones where investors coordinate on some arbitrary security. Changing financial and tax
policy in response to varying demand for the arbitrary collateral asset then would appear
to be not optimal.
28According to The Economist (“Losing interest,” June 14, 2008), the UK Debt Management Office
“argues that cost is not the only factor. There is a virtue in being predictable, and in keeping all sections
of the bond market supplied with debt to trade.”
29A private agent’s breach of contract can more easily be sanctioned by a court than a government’s
breach of promises. In the domain of international borrowing the situation may be less clear cut because
a private payment promise to a foreigner may not be more credible than a promise by the sovereign if
the latter can control national courts (“sovereign ceiling”).
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Second, the coordinated use of government securities may not be arbitrary but rather
the consequence of distortions like regulatory requirements that favour the use of these
securities.30 While demand for public debt might be strong in that case, due to an
implicit subsidy, supplying the debt just in order to satisfy demand is unlikely to be
socially beneficial.
Third, even if the demand for government securities is strong although it is not dis-
torted this may not imply that an accommodating debt policy is warranted. For example,
as one underlying cause for the special nature of government debt, it is often argued that
the latter effectively is default risk free and thus “informationally insensitive.” (This per-
ception might have changed during the recent financial crisis.) While it is possible for
public debt to be default risk free31 it is far from clear that a fiscal-monetary policy regime
that generates default risk free public debt is optimal. For the negative consequences of
servicing the debt in all contingencies (for example, due to very high tax rates during a
depression) may outweigh the benefits of access to default risk free securities for financial
market participants.32
Finally, it is unclear a priori whether the fiscal authority is best placed to respond
to “liquidity shocks” in financial markets or whether principal responsibility should lie
with the central bank. If a shock to the severity of moral hazard frictions undermines the
private sector’s ability to borrow, as in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998), and if changing the
time profile of tax collections does not aggravate other problems then a tax and financial
policy that helps alleviate the consequences of the frictions may well be optimal. But if
the liquidity shock reflects a sudden increase in the private sector’s preference for cash or
its (near) substitutes then an expansion of the supply of government securities may not
be optimal—even if financial markets applauded it because public debt combines cash like
features with a positive nominal return. Instead, the authority best positioned to directly
address the change in macroeconomic conditions then is the central bank.
Summarizing:
xvii. When commitment problems in the public sector are less severe than in the private
sector, government debt can effectively create private liquidity and help alleviate
frictions in the private sector.
30OECD (2013, p. 46) argues that “[t]he demand for safe sovereign assets has increased due to regulatory
changes, non-conventional balance sheet policies by central banks, heightened risk aversion (leading to the
use of high grade collateral to support funding and other transactions), and a build-up of foreign exchange
reserves in several countries.” As examples for regulatory changes, changing risk weights, liquidity buffers
for banks, regulatory pressures to hold high grade collateral and greater use of central counterparties
(CCPs) in OTC derivatives markets are given.
31See, for example, the discussion in Leeper (1991) on “active” or “passive” policy regimes. Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba (2011) review the literature on the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy.
32Berriel and Bhattarai (2013) analyze a different motivation to hold government debt. In their model,
a government mostly spends in terms of domestic goods and taxes domestic citizens. Citizens wish
to hold government bonds because this provides insurance against shocks that lead to a revaluation of
government debt, for example inflation shocks. They also wish to hold domestic equity whose price rises if
the government’s demand for domestic production rises. Note that in this model, the favourable hedging
characteristics of public debt for private agents do not a priori provide a reason for the government to
adjust its optimal financial policy.
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xviii. Even if financial market participants perceive government debt as a particularly
valuable asset class supplying such debt more than otherwise needed may not be
warranted.
4 Politics
4.1 Fostering Credibility
If policy makers lack commitment, an equilibrium policy does not only have to satisfy
the requirement that it implements an economic equilibrium but it must also be incentive
compatible or time consistent. The incentive compatibility constraints (weakly) reduce
the value of a policy program (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). By relaxing the incentive
compatibility constraints, financial policy can help reduce the social losses that arise as a
consequence of policy makers’ lack of commitment.
4.1.1 Taxes
Lucas and Stokey (1983) analyze the program of a Ramsey government that aims at
minimizing tax distortions in a closed economy and has access to an unrestricted set of
Arrow securities. They assume that the government can commit to debt repayment but
not to a tax plan. The allocation implemented under the ex-ante optimal tax policy
uniquely determines the market value of outstanding debt in every period (and history)
but it does not pin down the maturity structure of debt.
While the choice of maturity structure thus is irrelevant ex ante it is non-neutral ex
post. This is a consequence of the fact that a change of tax policy ex post affects equilib-
rium interest rates and thus, has a differential effect on the market value of outstanding
short-term or long-term debt (see the discussion of Angeletos’s (2002) model in subsec-
tion 3.2.1). Holding the initial market value of outstanding debt constant, variations in
the maturity structure therefore make it more or less costly to change the tax policy ex
post.
Lucas and Stokey (1983) demonstrate how the government can exploit this feature in
order to render the Ramsey policy time consistent. They show that there exists a unique
maturity structure with the property that any incentive to change tax policy ex post
in order to exploit modified tax elasticities is exactly counter balanced by the incentive
not to change policy because this would increase the market value of the outstanding
debt (Persson, Persson and Svensson, 1987). Clearly, this role of the maturity structure
ceases to exist if equilibrium interest rates are exogenous, as for example in a small open
economy.
The general point of Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) analysis relates to the fact that financial
policy may be neutral ex ante but non-neutral ex post by affecting future state variables.
In Lucas and Stokey (1983), this state variable is the maturity structure of outstanding
debt and thus, the elasticity of the market value of outstanding net debt with respect to
changes in tax policy. More generally, it can be any state that determines the strength of
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negative side effects of a policy change ex post.33
Summarizing:
xix. With lack of commitment to distorting tax policy, making the market value of
government debt responsive to ex-post policy changes can help render the ex-ante
optimal tax policy time consistent. When interest rates vary with the tax policy
the maturity structure may be employed to that effect.
4.1.2 Debt Repayment
With lack of commitment to debt repayment, a government honors its debt obligations
only if the cost of default exceeds the cost of transferring principal and interest to the
creditors. The cost of default may result from a loss of trust, unwarranted distributive
implications, output losses or, if creditors are international investors, from sanctions or
disruptions on international financial markets, exclusion from trade or trade credit or even
military intervention.34 The cost of transferring funds to creditors amounts to the social
value of public funds net of the social value of funds owned by the creditors (the latter
value may equal zero, in particular if creditors are foreign nationals).35
With sovereign credit risk, higher debt issuance typically reduces the probability of
future repayment. Assume for simplicity that the government in period t + 1 incurs a
cost Lt+1 in case of default where Lt+1 is the realization of a random variable with cumu-
lative distribution function G(·). The government then repays short-term non-contingent
liabilities maturing in period t + 1, lt,t+1, if and only if Lt+1 ≥ lt,t+1. Letting δ denote
the discount factor of risk neutral international investors, sovereign debt lt,t+1 therefore is
priced at qt,t+1 = δ(1− F (lt,t+1)) and a marginal increase of lt,t+1 raises the government’s
value by
−ζtu′tlt,t+1δG′(lt,t+1) + δ(1−G(lt,t+1))ζtu′t − βEt[ζt+1u′t+1|no default].
This marginal effect consists of three parts. The two terms on the right-hand side
represent the smoothing benefit from the marginal unit of debt.36 Issuance of a marginal
33Rogers (1986) and Armenter (2007) show how distributive implications of tax policy changes may
counteract a government’s incentive to renege on the ex-ante optimal policy.
34Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) argue that the threat of financial autarky discourages strategic default.
For discussions and applications of this hypothesis as well as analyses of the role played by the available
financial instruments, see Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), Grossman and Han (1999), Kletzer and Wright
(2000), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, ch. 19),
among many others. Cole and Kehoe (1998) and Sandleris (2006) argue that a sovereign default serves as
a negative signal, inducing parties outside of the credit relationship to initiate actions that are costly for
the government. Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), Cole and Kehoe (2000), Aguiar
and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008) consider more direct default costs in the form of output losses.
See Eaton and Fernandez (1995) for an overview over the literature and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004),
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006, pp. 49–52) or Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009) for a
discussion of the costs of sovereign defaults.
35Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980) discuss the government’s incentive to default when
taxes are distorting.
36This smoothing benefit resembles the consumption smoothing benefit in a household savings problem.
It differs because of the presence of default risk and the multiplier ζ.
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unit of debt at price δ(1 − G(lt,t+1)) provides current funds that are valued at ζtu′t but
requires repayment in the non-default states in the subsequent period.37 The term on the
left-hand side represents the negative effect on the funds raised from the inframarginal
units of debt. A direct consequence of lack of commitment, this effect arises because a gov-
ernment’s choice of debt issuance alters the subsequent government’s choice of repayment
and thus, the current price.
Default risk has positive and negative consequences for the value of the government’s
program. On the positive side, default renders debt implicitly state contingent and thereby
may improve risk sharing (Zame, 1993). On the negative side, default gives rise to losses
which are reflected in the leftmost term of the marginal effect discussed above.38
Niepelt (2011) analyzes a setup where the government may issue both short- (one-
period) and long-term (two-period) debt. He assumes that a default decision affects all
liabilities maturing in that period, both short-term debt issued in the previous period
and long-term debt issued two periods before (pari passu). Niepelt (2011) shows that
an appropriate choice of maturity structure can help limit the losses that arise as a
consequence of the government’s lack of commitment. Intuitively, for each maturity, the
negative effect on the funds raised from inframarginal units relative to the smoothing
benefit from the marginal unit is a convex function of the quantity of that maturity. As a
consequence, the equilibrium maturity structure is interior. It smoothes cost-benefit ratios
across maturities, in parallel to tax rates in optimal tax policy problems that smooth tax
distortions (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983).
Niepelt (2011) shows that in the sovereign debt context, lack of commitment manifests
itself twofold: In the ex-post optimal choice of repayment rate which causes the negative
effect on the funds raised from inframarginal units; and in the ex-post optimal choice of
new debt issuance which affects the size of this effect. The convexity of the cost-benefit
ratio mentioned earlier implies that more inherited, outstanding debt leads a government
to reduce new short-term debt issuance (the second manifestation). Long-term debt
issuance therefore increases the amount of debt maturing in the long term by less than
one-to-one, in contrast with the issuance of one-period debt which results in a one-to-one
increase in the amount of debt coming due in the subsequent period. As a consequence
of this difference, long-term debt issuance has a smaller price impact than short-term
debt issuance, due to the tight connection between the amount of debt coming due and
the default risk (the first manifestation). This smaller price impact gives rise to an
advantageous cost-benefit ratio of long-term debt. As a result, the equilibrium maturity
structure is tilted towards the long end. Higher levels of debt worsen the cost-benefit
37The marginal effect of debt issuance on the government’s continuation value equals the expected loss
from repaying the marginal unit of debt. Although a small increase in lt,t+1 also affects the repayment
probability of the inframarginal units of debt, no welfare effects due to less likely repayment of infra-
marginal units is apparent. This is a consequence of the fact that less likely repayment of inframarginal
units goes hand in hand with more likely default costs Lt+1. The welfare effects associated with these
two changes cancel since the subsequent government is indifferent at the margin between repaying or
defaulting, and due to the congruence of the subsequent government’s objective function and the current
government’s continuation value function. See Niepelt (2011) for a discussion.
38See the discussion in Niepelt (2011). The fact that default risk reduces average debt repayment does
not have welfare implications because the price of debt accounts for this.
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ratio of long-term debt and high debt-to-GDP ratios therefore go hand in hand with a
more balanced maturity structure.
The picture that emerges from the closed-form solutions in Niepelt’s (2011) model
is one of an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions, in line with the
empirical evidence, but in contrast with predictions from models that stress the role of
the maturity structure in completing markets or avoiding bad equilibria with rollover
crises (see the discussion in subsections 3.2 and 3.3). The model predicts a shortening
of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, in line with evidence summarized
by Rodrik and Velasco (1999); around times of low output (“crises”), consistent with the
evidence reported by Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2012); and in periods with low
output volatility.39
In Lucas and Stokey (1983) an appropriate choice of maturity structure fully relaxes
the no-commitment constraints in the government’s program and allows to implement the
Ramsey tax policy. In Niepelt (2011), in contrast, the Ramsey policy cannot be imple-
mented; an appropriate choice of maturity structure softens the negative consequences
of lack of commitment in that model but it cannot eliminate them completely. Niepelt
(2004a) shows that this negative result can be overturned if the government is not indif-
ferent with respect to the wealth distribution among its creditors and if it can control the
debt ownership structure. Since the latter determines the distributive implications of a
government default, a government can be discouraged from defaulting if the ownership
structure is tilted towards favored groups.40 With an appropriate choice of ownership
structure of sovereign debt, the Ramsey tax policy therefore can be implemented even if
the government cannot commit.41 Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and Missale and Blanchard
(1994) discuss the role of debt indexation, denomination and maturity in softening the
negative consequences of lack of commitment.
Summarizing:
xx. With lack of commitment to debt repayment and pari passu, a balanced maturity
structure can help minimize the social losses caused by the no-commitment friction.
xxi. With lack of commitment to debt repayment and government preferences with re-
spect to the wealth distribution of government creditors, an appropriate ownership
structure of public debt can help counteract ex-post incentives to default.
4.2 Improving Fiscal Policy Choices
As is well understood and was mentioned before, financial policy can not only help col-
lect taxes in the least distorting manner (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983) but also
39For a related, quantitative analysis see Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012).
40See also Tabellini (1991), Dixit and Londregan (2000) or Kremer and Mehta (2000).
41Dellas and Niepelt (2012) analyze a model where the ownership structure of public debt affects the
sovereign’s cost of defaulting and thus, the severity of the no-commitment problem. They argue that
official lenders like the IMF or the European Union are better placed to induce sovereign debtors to
service outstanding loans than private lenders and they use this argument to explain the recent debt
crisis in countries like Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal or Spain.
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allocate tax burdens across groups in the preferred way (Diamond, 1965; Niepelt, 2004b).
The latter role is important not only for equity reasons. For if government spending is
determined in the political process (rather than being exogenously given as often assumed
in analyses of financial policy) then the possibility to shift the burden of taxation may
facilitate better societal government spending choices.
Bassetto and Sargent (2006) make this point in the context of an overlapping gen-
erations economy where government spending on durable public goods is decided in the
political process. Suppose for simplicity that in each period, there are young and old
agents alive; old agents die at the end of the period. Government spending benefits both
age groups to the same extent, and taxes are collected symmetrically from both groups.
Under these conditions, young agents prefer much higher government spending than old
agents if spending is fully financed by contemporaneous taxes (because the young enjoy
the benefits of public spending over two periods rather than just one). If spending is
partly financed through the issuance of public debt that is serviced by future tax payers,
in contrast, then the conflict of interest between young and old voters is reduced. De-
pending on the aggregation of group preferences in the political process, one financing
arrangement may be preferable to the other in terms of delivering good outcomes.42
Bassetto and Sargent (2006) analyze the relationship between the durability of public
goods, population growth and the optimal extent of debt financing and they relate their
findings to the benchmark “golden rule” according to which nondurable goods and services
should be financed out of contemporaneous taxes while durable goods may be financed
by issuing debt.
Summarizing:
xxii. By shifting tax burdens to specific groups in society, tax and financial policy can
contribute to improved fiscal policy choices.
5 Conclusion
We have reviewed mechanisms through which financial policy may contribute towards
achieving various goals. Summaries i. to xxii. throughout the body of the paper collect
the main findings.
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Questions
The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council has requested a scientific report that addresses (some
of) the following questions:
a. Should the medium run target for the surplus quota under the current Swedish fiscal
policy framework be amended with targets for gross and net debt quotas?
b. How should the objective to provide fiscal buffers (allowing automatic stabilisers
to work and giving room for discretionary spending during downturns) be reflected
in gross and net debt quotas and in the liquidity of positions on the government’s
balance sheet?
c. Can the objective to secure market access under adverse funding conditions ratio-
nalize larger gross debt issuance than otherwise warranted during normal times?
d. Does demand by financial market participants for “safe” government debt imply
that governments should issue more debt than otherwise warranted, in particular
during times of financial market stress?
e. How should the government’s balance sheet be structured?
f. Should assets be actively managed and domestically invested?
Answers
The Council’s questions a.–f. are connected to each other, with question e. being the
broadest one. They relate to the general theme of “financial policy,” defined as the
government’s shifting of purchasing power over time and across states of nature, using
market transactions. Financial policy such defined contrasts with tax policy which is
concerned with when and how the government collects taxes from the private sector.
Budget constraints link the two policy areas.
I submit two documents in response to the Council’s questions. The first one, entitled
“Financial Policy,” surveys theoretical results. The second document—the one at hand—
contains answers to the Council’s questions and relates them to the findings in the survey
paper.
1
Findings of the survey paper The survey paper is divided into three main sections,
sections 2–4. Section 2 builds on basic accounting identities to clarify the relationships be-
tween the appropriation of (primary) budget surplus funds and the accumulation of gross
and net assets and liabilities. Section 3 reviews qualitative and quantitative theoretical re-
sults on optimal (Ramsey) financial policies under commitment. The policy prescriptions
discussed in this section derive from four central motives of financial policy—to exploit
arbitrage opportunities; to smooth the shadow value of public funds subject to plausible
restrictions on the set of available financial instruments; to strengthen resilience; and to
achieve other goals like market access or liquidity provision to the private sector. Section
4 reviews theoretical results on optimal financial policy that explicitly take political fac-
tors into account. Of central interest in that context are issues of credibility and incentive
compatibility.
The main findings of the survey paper are collected in summaries which are reproduced
here for convenience.
Accounting:
i. Convergent dynamics in a surplus regime may arise in dynamically inefficient and ef-
ficient economies; in a primary-surplus regime, they require a dynamically inefficient
economy.
ii. A convergent surplus regime almost always implies a different transition path and
steady state net asset quota than a primary-surplus regime.
iii. In a convergent surplus regime, the appropriation of the surplus as well as the
difference between the capital gains rates on assets and liabilities affect the net
asset quota. Similarly, in a convergent primary-surplus regime, the appropriation
of the primary surplus as well as the difference between the returns on assets and
liabilities affect the net asset quota.
iv. In a convergent surplus regime, an increase in the surplus quota typically has a
stronger positive effect on the steady state net asset quota if it funds the accumu-
lation of assets rather than the repayment of liabilities.
Ramsey policies:
v. Gross government borrowing optimally exceeds net borrowing when the govern-
ment’s lending rate exceeds the borrowing rate and if the government wishes to
relax its budget constraint.
vi. The government’s portfolio choice problem parallels the program of a private in-
vestor. The optimal portfolio composition depends on the correlation between se-
curity returns and the tightness of the government budget constraint.
vii. With complete markets, the shadow value of public funds is constant and conditional
on the government’s inter temporal budget constraint, tax and financial policy are
disconnected.
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viii. Bohn (1990) assesses which securities may be employed to smooth the shadow value
of government funds across states. His analysis could be updated and his approach
extended and applied to other countries.
ix. The restriction that securities may not have state contingent yields is not costly if
the government has access to a sufficiently rich set of maturities and interest rates
are state contingent. In this case, markets are complete and the non-contingent
yield restriction implies an optimal maturity structure. According to simulation
results, the predictions of the complete market approach to the choice of maturity
structure are sensitive to changes in the model specification and not in line with the
data.
x. According to simulation results, restrictions on the set of available securities have
minor costs. However, the predictions of the incomplete market approach to the
choice of maturity structure are sensitive to changes in the model specification and
not in line with the data.
xi. When yields are specified in nominal terms and are restricted to be non-contingent
unanticipated inflation can partially compensate for the lack of explicit state con-
tingency. But misallocation as a consequence of unanticipated inflation renders this
costly. According to simulation results, unanticipated inflation is an inefficient fiscal
shock absorber unless the shocks are very large.
xii. Even if the government has access to a rich set of maturities and interest rates are
stochastic, markets may be incomplete if a non-contingent yield restriction is accom-
panied by a (stochastic) borrowing constraint. In this case, the optimal financial
policy trades off insurance and inter temporal smoothing.
xiii. For the choice of maturity of government securities, the objective to hedge fiscal
shocks may or may not conflict with the objective to relax borrowing constraints,
while the objective to hedge fiscal shocks always conflicts with the objective to
generate surpluses in normal times. These conflicts are present for any level of
primary surplus or net asset quota.
xiv. In the presence of an illiquidity premium, the objective to provide liquidity during
a sudden stop conflicts with the objective to generate surpluses in normal times.
This conflict is present for any level of primary surplus or net asset quota.
xv. The probability of a bad equilibrium with a rollover crisis may depend on the extent
of short-term funding, the currency denomination of public debt and central bank
policy as well as the ownership structure of public debt. A better contracting
approach may help eliminate the bad equilibrium.
xvi. A concern for market access under adverse funding conditions may rationalize larger
gross borrowing and lending positions than otherwise warranted.
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xvii. When commitment problems in the public sector are less severe than in the private
sector, government debt can effectively create private liquidity and help alleviate
frictions in the private sector.
xviii. Even if financial market participants perceive government debt as a particularly
valuable asset class supplying such debt more than otherwise needed may not be
warranted.
Politics:
xix. With lack of commitment to distorting tax policy, making the market value of
government debt responsive to ex-post policy changes can help render the ex-ante
optimal tax policy time consistent. When interest rates vary with the tax policy
the maturity structure may be employed to that effect.
xx. With lack of commitment to debt repayment and pari passu, a balanced maturity
structure can help minimize the social losses caused by the no-commitment friction.
xxi. With lack of commitment to debt repayment and government preferences with re-
spect to the wealth distribution of government creditors, an appropriate ownership
structure of public debt can help counteract ex-post incentives to default.
xxii. By shifting tax burdens to specific groups in society, tax and financial policy can
contribute to improved fiscal policy choices.
Before responding to the Council’s questions two shortcomings should be pointed out.
First, as is evident from the above list of findings, no quantitative recommendations are
put forward. Such recommendations would require a serious quantitative analysis that
explicitly accounts for institutional factors relevant for Sweden which is beyond the scope
of the report.
Second, it might be useful to understand the policy choices of other countries that are
or were confronted with similar questions as those posed by the Council. Switzerland (with
a relatively low gross liabilities quota and low or negative funding needs) and Noway (with
significant net assets and surpluses) come to mind. As far as Switzerland is concerned,
questions from my side to representatives of the Swiss Federal Finance Administration
did not yield new insights. Regarding Norway, a statement by Norges Bank on its website
may serve to indicate some considerations underlying Norway’s financial policy strategy.1
1Norges bank answers the question “Why does the Norwegian government hold debt?” as follows:
“The Norwegian government is in an overall net asset position, i.e. total financial assets exceed total
debt. Government assets comprise investments through the Government Pension Fund Global, equity
holdings in domestic enterprises, deposits in Norges Bank and lending and direct investment in state
banks, state-owned enterprises and state limited companies. Government debt consists primarily of
government bonds and Treasury bills.
The non-oil budget deficit is financed by transfers from the Government Pension Fund Global. Pay-
ments of principal on government debt, net lending and capital deposits in state banks etc. are covered
by borrowing and/or by drawing on the government’s cash reserves. Thus, the government both borrows
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Response to question a. The medium run target for the surplus quota under the
Swedish fiscal policy framework should be replaced by a target for the net financial asset
quota. Targets for gross financial asset and liabilities quotas should not be specified.
A medium term surplus target typically is motivated by the aim to stabilize gov-
ernment net financial assets and thus, to constrain inter (as well as intra) generational
redistribution and guarantee a minimal degree of tax smoothing over the medium and
longer term. These motives also underly the Swedish fiscal framework (Swedish Fiscal
Policy Council, 2012, p. 77).2 But as findings iii.-iv. in the survey paper make clear and is
also repeatedly pointed out by Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2012, pp. 13, 80), a surplus
quota per se does not pin down a specific net asset quota. It is only in combination with
other policy choices and macroeconomic variables that the former implies the latter. Cen-
tral among the other policy choices is the appropriation of surplus funds and in particular,
the part of the surplus that funds asset accumulation as opposed to liability redemption;
central among the macroeconomic variables are interest rates, capital gains rates and the
growth rate. As a consequence, the medium term surplus target does not directly relate
to the policy objective under the Swedish fiscal framework.
It is therefore advisable to find a consensus on the net financial asset quota that cor-
responds with the objectives that guided the choice of surplus quota in the first place (see
also the responses to the other questions)3, and a consensus on the speed of convergence
towards this quota (half life). The two elements should be included as targets in the fiscal
framework. Ideally, the target for the net financial asset quota should be specified contin-
gent on the relevant macroeconomic environment. (For example, the net financial asset
quota conforming with preferences regarding intergenerational distribution may depend
on the government’s physical capital stock, expected productivity growth or the projected
environmental quality.)
Since in the medium and long run, the surplus target is superfluous at best and
in the debt market and saves in the Government Pension Fund Global.
An important objective of government borrowing is to promote stable developments in the Norwe-
gian economy. A gradual and predictable phasing-in of government petroleum revenues in the economy is
conducive to stable expectations in the foreign exchange market. The government must also maintain ade-
quate liquidity to cover daily payments. Short-term borrowing in the market ensures that the government
has sufficient funds to meet its payment obligations at all times. The Ministry of Finance aims to keep
the level of government cash reserves above NOK 50 billion.” See http://www.norges-bank.no/en/price-
stability/government-debt/why-government-debt/.
2According to Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2012, p. 77), “[t]he Government in its Communication,
The fiscal framework (Ministry of Finance 2011), gives four reasons for the surplus target. First, the
target should contribute to long-term sustainable finances. Second, the surplus target should contribute
to sufficient margins so that large deficits can be avoided in economic downturns even with a policy that
actively works to counter economic downturns. A surplus target helps provide a buffer that makes it
possible to counter sharp downturns in the economy without the risk that the increase in the public
debt will be unsustainable. Third, the surplus target should contribute to an equal distribution of
resources between generations. Last, the target should contribute to economic efficiency by creating
better conditions for smoothing the tax take over time.” As emphasized by Swedish Fiscal Policy Council
(2012, p. 77), “these reasons are related to the level and growth of the public debt rather than the budget
balance at a particular point in time.”
3This recommendation parallels a request by Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2012, p. 78) for the
government to provide guidance as to the relation between the surplus target and optimal debt levels.
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confusing or conflicting at worst if the net financial asset quota is targeted, the former
should be dropped as an element of the fiscal framework. Alternatively, rather than
specifying a target for the net financial asset quota and dropping the surplus target,
one may keep the surplus target and augment it by a target for the appropriation of
the surplus. But this approach is more complex. For the mapping from surplus and
appropriation to net financial assets necessarily involves the macroeconomic state even if
the targeted net financial asset quota is not contingent on the latter. Keeping the surplus
target may be more attractive on political grounds however. A change of target requires
convincing communication to the public. Absent such communication, the change of
target may be misinterpreted as an indication for a change in the underlying motivation
and thus, undermine credibility.
As several other findings in the survey paper make clear (for example, findings ix. and
xii.), structuring the government’s balance sheet in specific ways can help attain targeted
net asset quotas in spite of incomplete markets or adverse funding conditions. The man-
agement of gross asset and liabilities positions therefore is important. But gross asset and
liabilities quotas constitute instruments rather than policy goals, and their optimal val-
ues generally vary with economic conditions. Targets for gross positions therefore should
not be included in the fiscal framework. Instead, fiscal policy makers should be asked to
explain on a regular basis whether and how the government’s gross asset and liabilities
quotas contribute towards attaining the specified net financial asset target under different
scenarios.
Response to question b. The extent to which the objective to provide fiscal buffers
should be reflected in gross and net debt quotas and in the liquidity of positions on the
government’s balance sheet depends on the risk-return characteristics of the securities at
the government’s disposal; their maturities as well as the correlation between interest rates
and the tightness of borrowing constraints; and the return premium on illiquid assets.
Whether a government optimally accumulates precautionary or buffer stock savings
depends on the constraints that are imposed on its lending and borrowing, in parallel
to a private investor. Such constraints may derive from the fact that securities with
specific returns are not available and thus, that the government cannot hold a portfolio
whose return spans the state space. Or they may reflect constraints on the quantity
of securities purchases or sales (beyond the inter temporal budget constraint). Both
types of constraints may render markets incomplete; absent either type of constraint, the
government faces complete markets and does not accumulate precautionary nor buffer
stock savings.
With the first type of constraint binding, the government faces a standard portfolio
choice problem and as a consequence, optimally engages in precautionary savings. Aiya-
gari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppa¨la¨ (2002) analyze the precautionary savings motive under
the assumption that the government may only issue short-term debt with non-contingent
yield. They find that the government optimally accumulates net assets up to the point
where the interest income from the net asset position suffices to finance worst case gov-
ernment spending. In Aiyagari et al.’s (2002) representative agent environment the inter
generational wealth distribution is of no concern, in contrast to real world settings in-
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cluding the Swedish case. Future research should analyze how distributive concerns affect
Aiyagari et al.’s (2002) result.4 This research would have a direct bearing on the question
which net financial asset position Sweden should target (see the response to question a.).
The government’s optimal portfolio structure guarantees that the tightness of the
government budget constraint is uncorrelated with the returns of all securities at the
government’s disposal (see finding vi. in the survey paper).5 It is advisable to conduct
an analysis along the lines of Bohn (1990) to identify securities with useful risk sharing
characteristics for the Swedish government (see finding viii. in the survey paper).
With the second type of constraint binding, the government may or may not face
incomplete markets. The most relevant instance of a quantity constraint on securities
sales or purchases is a borrowing constraint. If the government only has access to short-
term debt, the risk of a future binding borrowing constraint optimally induces buffer
stock savings (Gollier, 2001, ch. 18). But if the government has access to long-term debt
instruments then the borrowing constraint may be “circumvented” without cost and the
optimal policy does not involve buffer stock savings.
If yields on government securities are non-contingent and a borrowing constraint is
imposed, issuance of long-term debt may help relax future borrowing constraints but at
the same time, it may be counter productive from a risk sharing perspective, depending on
the stochastic properties of interest rates (see findings xii. and xiii. in the survey paper). To
assess the benefits and costs of long-term debt it is advisable to check how interest rates for
the Swedish government (are expected to) correlate with borrowing constraints. If interest
rates (are expected to) tend to drop when a borrowing constraint binds then long-term
net lending provides insurance because the market value of outstanding long-term loans
appreciates in a sudden stop. But since long-term net lending and correspondingly, short-
term net borrowing also reduces liquid wealth during a sudden stop, a trade-off exists.
If, in contrast, interest rates (are expected to) tend to rise when a borrowing constraint
binds then long-term net borrowing and correspondingly, short-term net lending provides
both insurance and fiscal space during a sudden stop.
Similar conclusions apply when the liquidity of balance sheet positions is unrelated to
maturity. The optimal exposure to liquid assets decreases with the return premium on
illiquid assets (see finding xiv. in the survey paper).
Response to question c. The objective to secure market access under adverse funding
conditions may rationalize larger gross debt issuance than otherwise warranted but the
case is a weak one until the sensitivity of the borrowing rate with respect to borrowing
during previous periods is better understood.
If borrowing rates respond “favourably” to borrowing during previous periods, then
debt issuance does not only benefit the government by generating funds but also by
improving market conditions in the future. Accordingly, larger gross debt issuance than
4Bhandari, Evans, Golosov and Sargent (2013) extend Aiyagari et al.’s (2002) model to incorporate
heterogeneity.
5Farhi (2010, p. 936) discusses how the tightness of the government budget constraint may be approx-
imated by a statistic of government spending (which is easier to measure than the tightness of the budget
constraint).
7
otherwise warranted is optimal (see finding xvi. in the survey paper). However, absent
a better understanding of whether rates do respond favourably and if so how, no strong
case for a particular policy can be made. For the exact form of the benefit function is
of central importance for the policy implications, similar to the situation in models of
optimal investment where the adjustment cost function is critical for the results (e.g.,
Hayashi (1982) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). As a simple example, consider the case
where debt issuance generates a “fixed benefit” in terms of improved market conditions
in the future; in that case it could be optimal to only issue tiny amounts of each security.
Even if borrowing rates do respond favourably and in a smooth manner, it does not
necessarily follow that higher debt issuance is warranted, for the same reason that arbi-
trage opportunities for the government need not imply that the government should exploit
them (see the discussion before finding v. in the survey paper). What is needed in ad-
dition is that there is social value in transferring income from the government’s counter
parties to the government.
Response to question d. Demand by financial market participants for “safe” gov-
ernment debt does not imply that governments should issue more debt than otherwise
warranted, even during times of financial market stress. While it may be optimal for tax
and financial policy to respond to severe relative commitment problems in the private
sector the central bank is better placed to accommodate shocks to the demand for cash
or close substitutes.
Issuing government (net) debt may have beneficial macroeconomic effects unrelated
to “tax smoothing” or “tax shifting” considerations if delayed taxation relaxes private
sector borrowing constraints due to commitment problems and thus, fosters productive
private sector activity (Woodford, 1990; Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1998). A prerequisite
for this is that the commitment problems in the private sector are more severe than in
the public sector (see finding xvii. in the survey paper). In the beginning of the recent
financial market crisis, this was arguably the case. Subsequently, however, commitment
problems in the public sector have increasingly been perceived as equally pronounced if
not more so. From that perspective, debt financing should optimally have been high in
the beginning of the crisis when private sector commitment problems appeared relatively
severe but not necessarily later on.
Arguments for other alleged macroeconomic benefits of debt issuance are less convinc-
ing. The empirical observation that government debt plays a prominent role in financial
market transactions does not imply that this role must be played by government debt and
that playing the role is socially beneficial. Providing a large volume of risk free (but inter-
est bearing) government securities could well be costly in terms of undermining optimal
tax and financial policy (narrowly defined) while at the same time being applauded by
financial market participants. Moreover, if the demand for government debt instruments
is driven by a shock to the demand for cash or close substitutes then the central bank is
in a better position to accommodate it (see finding xviii. in the survey paper).
If the private sector’s demand for government securities generates arbitrage oppor-
tunities for the government and if there is social value in transferring income from the
government’s counter parties to the government then an accommodating tax and financial
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policy may be socially beneficial (see finding v. in the survey paper). It is advisable to
check empirically whether this is the case.
Response to questions e. and f. The government’s balance sheet should be structured
in accordance with the findings of the survey paper that are empirically relevant for
Sweden. The distinction between foreign and domestic assets is not central. Whether
assets should be actively managed cannot be answered from a financial policy centred
perspective.
The survey paper discusses several motivations for specific financial policies, with
direct implications for the optimal structure of the government’s balance sheet. We discuss
the motivations in turn.
Exploiting Arbitrage Opportunities : The theoretical discussion summarized in finding
v. of the survey paper suggests a potentially important role for gross asset and liabilities
positions if the government may exploit arbitrage opportunities. There seems to be broad
agreement that a relaxation of the government budget constraint in Sweden would be
socially beneficial (that is, the possibility to administer a lump sum transfer from the pri-
vate to the public sector would be welfare improving). As a consequence, the government
should exploit arbitrage possibilities and in particular, issue gross in excess of net debt if
government liabilities are overpriced relative to comparable privately issued securities. It
is advisable to check empirically whether this is the case.
Smoothing the Shadow Value of Public Funds : The implications for financial policy of
the objective to smooth the shadow value of public funds when markets are incomplete
or quantity restrictions on the sale and purchase of securities are in place have been
discussed earlier (see response to question b.). As mentioned there, it is advisable to
conduct an analysis along the lines of Bohn (1990) to identify securities with useful risk
sharing characteristics for the Swedish government and to estimate the correlation between
interest rates and borrowing constraints. Based on the theoretical discussions summarized
in findings vi., viii., xii., xiii. and xiv. of the survey paper as well as the empirical findings,
conclusions can be drawn for the optimal composition of the government’s portfolio as
well as the optimal size of the government’s balance sheet.
The usefulness of “foreign” securities (issued outside of Sweden, or by non-Swedish
institutions, or in a currency other than SEK) for tax smoothing and hedging purposes
should be assessed based on the same criteria as for “domestic” securities, namely their
risk-return characteristics and liquidity. While foreign securities may be exposed to more
risks than domestic ones they may still have useful insurance characteristics.
The discussions summarized in findings ix.–xi. of the survey paper suggest that the
complete market approach (as well as the incomplete market approach) to the choice
of maturity structure does not deliver robust policy implications and inflation does not
constitute an efficient instrument for risk sharing except during periods of severe fiscal
distress.
Strengthening Resilience: Multiple equilibria arguments suggest that resilience can
be strengthened by favoring long-term over short-term government debt and fostering
domestic debt ownership (see finding xv. in the survey paper). But with low projected
financing needs, rollover risk does not momentarily appear to be a first-order concern for
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Sweden even if dependence on foreign funding is substantial.6
Achieving Other Goals : The implications for financial policy of the objectives to se-
cure market access and to support macroeconomic liquidity have been discussed above
(responses to questions c. and d.). The main conclusion from there is that, when com-
mitment problems in the private sector relative to those in the public sector are severe,
tax and financial policy should help relax private sector borrowing constraints by raising
net public indebtedness.
Fostering Credibility : The implications for financial policy of the objective to limit
the welfare losses due to limited commitment to debt repayment relate to the maturity
structure and ownership structure of debt issuance in times when market participants
foresee default risk (see findings xx. and xxi. in the survey paper). But with Sweden’s
gross debt projected to fall from 37 to 24 percent of GDP between 2012 and 2017 and net
indebtedness predicted to fall from -18 to -20 percent over the same period (IMF, 2012,
Statistical Table 4) default risk in Sweden momentarily appears low.7
Improving Fiscal Policy Choices : Support by short-sighted pivotal interest groups
for public spending projects with long-term returns may be secured if a significant part
of such spending is paid by future taxpayers (see finding xxii. in the survey paper). A
“Golden Rule” for net debt or similar arrangements may be useful in that respect. This
reinforces the argument proposed in response to question a., namely that the target for
the net financial asset quota under the fiscal policy framework should ideally be specified
contingent on relevant state variables like the physical capital stock.
Finally, a remark on the “active” management of government assets. The financial
policy perspective adopted throughout the report is concerned with the question if and
how the government can and should use financial instruments to allocate purchasing power
across time and states of nature. From this perspective, the state contingent returns of
projects or securities are taken as given. A different question is whether the government
should try to affect the state contingent returns, for example by taking an “active” role.
There are at least two potential reasons why governments may want to take such a role.
First, because the government’s asset pricing kernel differs from the kernel of private
investors as reflected in financial market prices. In that case, investment and project
management choices that are value maximizing from the private sector’s point of view
are not value maximizing from the government’s perspective. Second, because corporate
governance or corporate finance aspects imply efficiency losses that the government can
alleviate by taking an active investor role. But there are also well known counter ar-
guments, in particular with reference to the dangers of political interference in business
decisions or inefficient management procedures. While these issues have been analyzed in
6Projected financing needs for the Swedish government are on the order of 5 percent of GDP in the
year 2014 (IMF, 2012, Table 8). Nearly half of Swedish general government debt is held by nonresidents
in the year 2012 (IMF, 2012, Statistical Table 12a). The ratio is on the order of 30–35 percent in several
other countries, with a higher ratio in Germany, France and some small economies but a much lower one
in Japan or Switzerland.
7Bi and Leeper (2010) come to a similar conclusion. They report simulation results based on a
calibration for Sweden’s post-1990s-crisis policy regime according to which public debt essentially remains
risk free even if the economy is hit by a series of negative shocks resembling those during the early 1990s.
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the literature8 a thorough review is beyond the scope of the report.
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